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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIMNTS

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
INTRODUCTORY

With the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by the Ohio
legislature,1 the cases reviewed in this article, decided under the now repealed Negotiable Instruments Law, serve chiefly as a means of referring
to the new law.
PAYEE NOT SUBJECT TO MAKER'S DEFENSE AGAINST STRANGER

In Ohio Loan & Discount Co. v. Tyarks,2 the maker of the note had
entered into a contract with K, financed by the plaintiff; and the note
was made out directly to the plaintiff as payee, rather than to K. There
was a failure of the consideration promised by K to the maker, but the
plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser and took before maturity. In a suit
by plaintiff against the maker, the latter set up as a defense the failure
of the consideration promised by K. The court held that in order for
failure of consideration to be a defense, such failure must be attributable
to the promisee and not to some third person operating independently of
the promisee. The subject of payee as holder in due course was not mentioned in the opinion. Might the case have been decided upon that
theory?'
DEFENSES:

GAMBLING

In Scolaro v. Bellitto,4 the court noted that under Ohio law, even a
holder in due course cannot recover upon a negotiable instrument issued
by the maker to the payee in payment of a gambling debt.5 But in this
particular case, the plaintiff payee merely loaned money which was used
by the maker to bet on a horse race, and the plaintiff knew nothing about
the use to which the money was to be put. Accordingly, held the court,
this case does not come within Ohio Revised Code section 3763.01, making notes given for gambling transactions void, and the judgment for
plaintiff was proper.'
1. OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1301.01-1309.50, effective July 1, 1962. The sections relating specifically to commercial paper are 1303.01 through 1303.78.
2. 173 Ohio St. 564, 184 N.E.2d 374 (1962).
3. See BRITrON, BILLS AND NoTEs § 122 (2d ed. 1961); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Central Nat'l Bank, 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953). The Uniform Commercial
Code permits a payee to be a holder in due course. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.31 (B).
4. 184 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio Cr. App. 1962).
5. See, in general, BurrTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 127.
6. The Uniform Commercial Code leaves to the law of each state the question whether such
a defense as gambling is a real or personal defense. See OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.34 (B) (2).
Section 3763.01 is not repealed.
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WANT OF CONSIDERATION

During 1962, in Ohio Loan & Discount Co. v. Tyarks, the Supreme
Court of Ohio finally had an opportunity to settle the Ohio law with reference to the burden of proof on the issue of want of consideration. The
court held that want of consideration is an affirmative defense, placing
the burden of proof upon the party who asserts it. Thus, for example, if
the payee sues the maker, who defends on want of consideration, the
maker has8 the burden of proving it. The Uniform Commercial Code is
in accord.
LIABILITY:

SIGNATURE IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY

Sherber v. O'Grady9 presented a problem under the former section
1301.22 of the Revised Code. This section, now repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code, provided, in substance, that when the instrument
contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs
for a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was authorized. However, the second sentence of the section states that the mere addition of words describing him as an agent or
as filling a representative character without disclosing his principal does
not exempt him from personal liability. In the Sherber case, a corporation of which defendant was president purchased various goods from the
plaintiff. The order blank showed that the sale was to the corporation,
and there was evidence to the same effect. Below the order blank was
a printed form of cognovit note, which defendant signed, "J. R. O'Grady,
Pres." The court held that the first sentence of the section, rather than
the second, applied, since the principal was disclosed. Consequently, Mr.
O'Grady was not liable."0
ALTERATION

Sherber v. O'Grady," referred to above, was also decided on the
ground of material alteration of the note by the plaintiff without the defendant's knowledge or consent. Under former section 1303.39, Ohio
Revised Code, a part of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a material alteration avoided the instrument under such circumstances, where it was not
in the hands of a holder in due course. 2
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173 Ohio St. 564, 184 N.E.2d 374 (1962).
OHIo REv. CODE §§ 1303.36(B), 1301.01(H).
113 Ohio App. 547, 175 N.E.2d 864 (1961).
The new statute is OHIO REV. CODE S 1303.39.

section.
11. 113 Ohio App. 547, 175 N.E.2d 864 (1961).
12. The new provision is OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.43.
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